The Problem of Coercion in State Apologies by Kushner, Jackson
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy
5-10-2019
The Problem of Coercion in State Apologies
Jackson Kushner
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kushner, Jackson, "The Problem of Coercion in State Apologies." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2019.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/253






Under the Direction of Andrew I. Cohen, PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
I argue that state apologies face a distinctive normative challenge. The reason for this is 
that when states apologize for their transgressions, they tend to implicate their citizens as morally 
responsible. However, because citizens are coerced into supporting state activities through taxa-
tion, I argue that their responsibility is mitigated. Citizens do not support state transgressions in 
the same way that private investors support corporate transgressions. Consequently, state apolo-
gies have a distinctive difficulty performing one of the core normative functions of apologies – 
namely, the admission of moral responsibility on behalf of a morally responsible party (or parties). 
Because of this, state apologies might be normatively deficient, and we should doubt their ability 
to provide robust moral repair. 
INDEX WORDS: Apology, Collective apology, State, Government, Transgression, Coercion, 
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On August 20, 2018, Pope Francis penned an open letter “To the People of God” addressing 
the horrific sexual abuse that has plagued the Catholic Church for many years. Interestingly, alt-
hough the letter repeatedly condemns this behavior, it does not attempt to seek pardon or provide 
material repair for the harm to victims or their families. It denies (correctly, I think) that any such 
material repair is possible. But we should make no mistake: this was an act of apology. In the 
Pope’s own words: 
It is essential that we, as a Church, be able to acknowledge and condemn, with sorrow and shame, 
the atrocities perpetrated by consecrated persons, clerics, and all those entrusted with the mission of 
watching over and caring for those most vulnerable. Let us beg forgiveness for our own sins and the 
sins of others. An awareness of sin helps us to acknowledge the errors, the crimes and the wounds 
caused in the past and allows us, in the present, to be more open and committed along a journey of 
renewed conversion. (Francis 2018)1 
Pope Francis is not apologizing only for the sexual abuse, for the Church owed an apology for its 
inaction in the face of evil. Pope Francis knew that the Church’s members – and thus the organi-
zation itself – had sinned, and that it owed the victims some form of repair. So through its most 
powerful representative, it apologized. 
Apologies by organizations abound in our society, but they do not always come from bod-
ies like the Church. Companies apologize, as do athletic leagues, and even states. In 1988, for 
example, President Reagan signed an official apology for the United States’ Japanese Internment 
program during WWII (Civil Liberties Act of 1988). Ordered by President Roosevelt, the infamous 
program incarcerated over 100,000 Japanese-Americans during the early 1940s, with no trials or 
due process. It was, unequivocally, a moral disaster. So on behalf of the United States, Reagan 
took a step toward moral repair by apologizing. 
                                                 
1 (Emphasis added.) This is clearly an apology. But this does not mean, necessarily, that any individual victim is in a 
position to accept it. It may be that only God can forgive this kind of transgression. What matters here is that the 
apology occurred, not that it was accepted. 
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We can see the importance of apologies not just for individuals, but also for massive or-
ganizations such as the Catholic Church and the United States. They serve an important normative 
function in our society. As individuals we rely on apology to preserve and restore relationships, 
curry favor, and atone for wrongdoing, among many other functions. Groups often do the same. 
As such, apologies can capture our collective attention; we judge them as good or bad depending 
on context, honesty, sincerity, and above all, effectiveness. Kevin Spacey’s apology in 2017 for 
allegedly sexually assaulting a minor was widely condemned, likely because it was perceived as 
an attempt to deflect attention away from the accusation (Victor 2017). By contrast, David Letter-
man’s 2009 apology for sleeping with a female staff member on his television show was highly 
effective (Carter and Stelter 2009). Rarely, however, do we discuss whether certain acts ought to 
count as apologies. Spacey and Letterman clearly both apologized, even if one did so more effec-
tively. But with groups such as the Catholic Church or the United States, it is not so easy to see 
that the purported apologies fit well within the same category. On behalf of whom did Pope Francis 
and President Reagan apologize, and with what authority? This question is my focus in this paper. 
For as I will argue, the two cases I have outlined reveal an important difference between apologies 
by non-state groups, such as the Church, and apologies by states, such as the U.S. There is a high 
threshold that all group apologies must meet in order to perform their primary normative function 
of moral repair. Namely, they must admit moral responsibility for a specific transgression on be-
half of a party that is actually responsible for that transgression. Private groups have less difficulty 
than states in meeting this goal because they do not coerce their members, but states do coerce 
their citizens. And because coercion has exculpatory moral force – that is, because people who are 
coerced into transgressing are not (as) responsible for the transgression (as they otherwise would 
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be) – states who apologize “on behalf of the people” risk implicating non-responsible parties. Be-
cause the Church, for example, does not coerce its members into transgressing, it can more easily 
avoid this problem. 
My argument to this effect proceeds as follows. In section 2 I say what it means for a group 
to count as an agent, note the difficulties of defining apology (group or otherwise), and give one 
desideratum that groups must meet in order to perform a primary normative function of apologies. 
That normative function is the admission of moral responsibility for a transgression, on behalf of 
a party that actually bears some moral responsibility. Acts that do not meet this desideratum are 
not disqualified from counting as apologies, but they are deficient in an important sense. In section 
3 I advance my main argument, namely that citizens of a transgressing state might not be respon-
sible, in the relevant sense, for their state’s transgressions. The reason for this is what I call the 
Coercion Problem: individuals cannot be responsible for a transgression if they were coerced into 
supporting it; thus an apology on their behalf would make some sort of mistake. Now, while the 
Coercion Problem is neither necessary nor specific to state apologies, states are especially prone 
to it. Because the state coerces its citizens (into, e.g., paying taxes, military service, and other 
activities that directly support transgressions), they cannot be held responsible in most cases. State 
apologies “on behalf of the people” are vulnerable to a serious deficiency, which has important 
normative implications. 
In the rest of the paper, I respond to five objections to my view. First, there is the objection 
that my view is trivial, for states do not purport to apologize on behalf of citizens. I respond, first, 
that we should take politicians and statutes seriously when they apologize “on behalf of the peo-
ple,” and second, that it is unclear how else we might construe state apologies. A second objection 
4 
is that citizens actually are responsible, at least in the sense of owing an apology, for state trans-
gressions. Different views of moral responsibility and group agency, including those of Rousseau, 
Christopher Kutz, and Iris Marion Young (inter alia), suggest that citizens may hold some respon-
sibility by virtue of their participation in a responsible institution. Here I respond that even if these 
views are correct, they do not account for the mitigating force of coercion on moral responsibility, 
so my argument stands. Third, one might object that my argument for the Coercion Problem proves 
too much, either by rendering all collective apologies deficient or by denying that victims of state 
transgressions even can receive a (non-deficient) apology. I respond to these objections separately. 
First, I explain that although non-state groups often pressure and exploit their members, they do 
not coerce them; thus individual responsibility is intact in these cases.2 Second, I concede that 
moral repair is normatively important, but deny that it must come on behalf of the citizens of a 
transgressing state. The individuals (or small group thereof) who are responsible for the transgres-
sion are the ones who should apologize; thus the possibility of moral repair is intact. 
2 GROUP APOLOGIES 
Most of the recent philosophical writing on group apologies has focused on whether groups 
can apologize, and if so, how. This is an ontological, not a normative question: it asks not whether 
groups should apologize, or even whether their apologies are sincere or effective, but whether they 
are the right kinds of agents to do so. In this paper, however, I am not concerned with whether 
groups can apologize. My claim here – that states face particular difficulties in apologizing – is 
primarily negative, so I assume that groups, generally speaking, can indeed apologize. If this as-
sumption proves wrong, this will only strengthen my argument against the probability of (non-
deficient) state apologies. So in this section, I will first explain what I mean by group, (or, more 
                                                 
2 Of course, some non-state groups are coercive. These groups are vulnerable to the same issues as states; however, 
they are not the institutions I am concerned with in this paper. Thanks to Andrew Altman for raising this concern. 
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specifically, group agent) and second, defend a desideratum that apologies – especially group 
apologies – should meet. 
2.1 Group Agents 
To begin, what is a group – or more specifically, a group agent? Drawing on Carl Wellman 
(1995), I will define it as a collection of individuals acting together according to implicitly or 
explicitly established norms that are recognized by both group members and parties with whom 
the group interacts.3 Wellman (1995: 157) says that these norms must stipulate or allow that “any 
act of one member (or a few members) is recognized as an act of the entire group.” Thus in order 
to be considered a group agent, a collection of individuals must be able to act. What does this 
mean? According to Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011: 20), agency entails “representational 
states, motivational states, and a capacity to process them and to act on their basis…” Representa-
tional states “depict how things are in the environment,” while motivational states depict how they 
should be (or how the agent wants them to be). The capacity to process and act upon these states 
is a function of whatever norms a given group has. These can take many forms. A representative 
of a large business might operate within a rigidly codified set of rules in order to guide her action 
while representing the corporation; a representative of a smaller business might rely more heavily 
upon implicit social norms. But either way, the norms are clearly established and recognizable; 
these norms identify the group both to its members and to outsiders (May 1983). Thus we can 
stipulate a definition: 
Group Agent: X is a group agent if and only if X is a group and X is an agent — 
that is, X is a collection of individuals that: 
a. has representational states; 
b. has motivational states; 
                                                 
3 I take norms to include explicit rules, laws, and procedures, as well as implicit expectations or social structures. A 
group of friends might operate based on informal social expectations, while a company might use a well-defined 
bureaucratic process. Either is sufficient to call the group a group agent. 
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c. can process these states and act on their basis through norms that are recog-
nized, implicitly or explicitly, by the individuals that constitute and interact with X. 
This definition is meant to be widely inclusive. The most-discussed group agents are large 
companies, but other entities — small businesses, churches, schools, student associations, softball 
leagues, courts, homeowners associations, unions, and most importantly, states — can be consid-
ered group agents as well. Each of these has some set of norms by which it acts, as well as an 
ability to judge its situation and establish preferences or goals in order to pursue them. Still, we do 
not want to be overly inclusive. A free market is not a group agent because the norms by which it 
operates do not allow us to recognize the actions of certain individuals within it as actions of the 
group (List and Pettit 2011: 12). Because of the market’s decentralized structure, no individual can 
plausibly claim to represent it, or more accurately, to act as it. Likewise, the definition of group 
agent excludes groups that lack norms altogether, such as the set of red-haired people in the world 
(List and Pettit 2011: 12).4 
2.2 The Difficulty of Defining Apology 
Defining apology is also complicated, in part because apologies are contextual; what counts 
as an apology may differ depending on the parties involved, their relationship to one another, and 
the transgression in question. A quick “sorry” I mutter after bumping into someone on a crowded 
train differs from the long-winded apology I make to my mother when I inform her that I cannot 
afford to fly home for Thanksgiving. Likewise, the apology a group offers for intentionally mis-
leading its customers is importantly different from the apology I make to my friend after lying to 
her. For all these reasons, it is not my goal here to give a complete definition of apology. As I have 
                                                 
4 As Linda Radzik (2001) points out, it is sometimes difficult to identify which groups have the necessary kinds of 
norms and which do not. The set of red-haired people in the world is clearly not a group agent, but what about the set 
of white people in America? Radzik claims that this group sometimes seems to function as an agent by upholding 
structural racism. I do not take up these issues here, though they are certainly interesting and important. 
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said, in this paper I argue that a certain desideratum for apologies is especially difficult to meet for 
a specific type of group agent, the state. Thus there is no need to specify sufficient conditions as 
well. 
Still, there is considerable disagreement over whether it is even possible to specify neces-
sary conditions for apology. As Nick Smith (2008: 24) puts it, “the meaning of any apology derives 
from its particular actors and context, and I doubt it would be useful to argue for the existence of 
a necessary and universal essence of a social practice like apologizing in light of its range of mean-
ings and cultural nuances.” Likewise, Jeffrey Helmreich (2015) declines to offer an account of 
apologies themselves, but rather characterizes an “apologetic stance” taken on by the apologizer. 
All this is to say that Smith is likely correct: possible counterexamples abound for any 
definition – or even any single necessary condition – we might give for apology. But this does not 
undermine our project here. For even if we suppose that it is impossible to specify any single 
necessary condition for all apologies, it is certainly possible to identify certain centrally important 
features of apologies. Any such feature may, of course, admit of exceptions. But some are features 
of so many apologies, and serve such an important normative purpose, that we might say apologies 
that lack them are at least aberrations if not somehow deficient. 
2.3 A Desideratum for Apologies: The Admission of Responsibility 
One central function of apologies, I submit, is the admission of moral responsibility. Apol-
ogy theorists seem to be mostly in consensus on this issue. Smith (2008: 141) identifies “ac-
ceptance of blame” as an important feature of apologies. (Indeed, the very title of his book, I Was 
Wrong, seems to signal the importance of accepting responsibility for wrongdoing when we apol-
ogize.) Likewise, Cohen and Samp (2013: 745) argue that an apologizer must “admit responsibility 
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for a transgression.”5 Richard Joyce (1999: 167) says that apologies include “the admission of 
responsibility.” Linda Radzik (2009: 92) similarly claims that “an apology must acknowledge the 
commission of a wrongful act or the holding of a wrongful trait.” Alice MacLachlan (2015: 443) 
agrees: “the speaker [of the apology] takes responsibility for… these [wrongful] actions, policies, 
or events.” The point of citing these various theorists, as I have said, is not to show that the admis-
sion of moral responsibility is a necessary condition for apology. Rather, it is to identify one of the 
most basic normative functions that apologies should perform.6 Given the strength of theoretical 
support for this particular function, let us stipulate that apologies that do not admit responsibility 
are somehow deficient, or at least so atypical as to challenge whether they ought properly to count 
as apologies. Moreover, we need not even claim that the admission of responsibility is a central 
feature of all apologies. For here we are mainly concerned with a particular type of group apology 
– namely state apologies. And it seems that regardless of what we might say about apologies in 
general, the admission of responsibility is indeed central to state apologies. Later, I will say more 
about what it means for an apology to be deficient, but for now let us examine what it means to 
admit responsibility. 
Note that the theorists I have cited here use a variety of terms to describe what I have taken 
to be the same concept. Smith calls it blame (or, we might say, blameworthiness); Joyce, Radzik, 
Cohen, and Samp all call it responsibility. So, there is also a variety of ways in which we might 
interpret this concept. Perhaps we could take it as the admission of legal liability: if I apologize to 
you, I admit that I am liable under the law for a specific harm that I have caused you. But this 
                                                 
5 Cohen (2018: 181) echoes this claim: “those who offer typical apologies also accept culpability for what they have 
done.” 
6 I borrow the term function from Cohen (2018: 180-181). He casts apologies as usually or often performing certain 
functions, and argues that even without positing necessary and sufficient conditions, we can criticize apologies for 
failing to perform these functions. 
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seems to miss the mark; we often apologize for actions that constitute transgressions yet are not 
(and should not be) illegal. So, perhaps these terms refer to the admission of a moral duty to pro-
vide material repair for whatever harm7 the apologizer caused. This is likely closer than the legal 
liability interpretation, but it still is not quite right. For we often apologize for acts that cause no 
harm – or at least no harm that can be easily repaired. Imagine, for instance, that I bump into 
someone on the street. Neither of us is (physically) injured, nor is our property damaged. It would 
be implausible to say that I ought to repair the harm I have caused them; what would I repair? But 
I still owe an apology for not looking where I was going.8 
Another option, drawing from Cohen and Samp, is to focus on responsibility. Their account 
of responsibility follows Angela M. Smith (2007), who claims that “to judge that a person is mor-
ally responsible for an action or attitude is to judge that she is responsible for it and that it is morally 
wrong or unjustifiable” (Smith 2007: 477). This judgment is “conceptually prior to both blaming 
attitudes and expressions of blame” because blame entails some action or emotion on the part of 
the blamer (Smith 2007: 467). So, we can liken responsibility not to blame, but to blameworthi-
ness.9 I do not mean to take a strong stance on this claim. I mean to say, rather, that the idea of 
responsibility picks out a distinct sense of moral wrongness, unjustifiability, or impermissibility: 
                                                 
7 I am careful here to call this a harm and not a wrong. It is possible, as I will discuss below, to harm someone without 
wronging them. It is also possible to wrong someone without harming them. But if apology is meant to entail the 
admission of a duty to provide non-moral repair, then a harm would have had to occurred; otherwise there would be 
nothing to repair. 
8 Indeed, Helmreich (2015) certainly thinks I owe an apology here, even though I am not blameworthy. He thinks that 
failing to apologize in this circumstance would treat the hapless person with whom I collided as something other than 
a moral patient. Thus I have not transgressed in bumping into them, but I would transgress if I did not acknowledge 
them. Apology here, then, is seen as a way to avoid transgressing, not (merely) as a way to repair a transgression. 
9 Adam Smith’s distinction between blame and blameworthiness illustrates this point nicely: “Praise and blame express 
what actually are; praise-worthiness and blame-worthiness, what naturally ought to be the sentiments of other people 
with regard to our character and conduct.” Whether someone is blamed for a transgression is not the question; the 
question, rather, is whether they are the proper object of blame. 
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to admit responsibility is to admit that one’s action (or inaction) was “morally wrong or unjustifi-
able,” regardless of whether one has actually been blamed for it or not.10 But even this reading 
seems slightly too strong, for once again, we might owe an apology even when we are not blame-
worthy or responsible for a particular act. To borrow a well-known example from Bernard Wil-
liams (1981: 28), consider a lorry driver who, “through no fault of his [own], runs over a child.” 
Clearly, says Williams, the truck driver is not at fault; yet “there is something special about his 
relation to this happening, something which cannot be eliminated by the consideration that it was 
not his fault” (Williams 1981: 28). And as Marc Cohen (2018: 593) notes, this seems to be the sort 
of responsibility for which apologies are appropriate: “apology can be necessary (and effective) 
[even] when the offender… is not morally blameworthy.”11 Thus we need not be blameworthy to 
owe an apology. 
The interpretation I will adopt in this paper is not, then, that a central feature of apologies 
is the admission of legal liability, a duty to repair, or moral responsibility or blameworthiness.12 I 
submit a slightly weaker, but still moralized interpretation: a central feature of apologies is that 
they are devices with which agents admit moral responsibility. On my view, moral responsibility 
entails neither blameworthiness nor a responsibility to provide material repair, but, crucially, it can 
entitle the victim of a transgression or harm to an apology. The idea is that even if an agent is not 
blameworthy, she may still owe the victim an apology in virtue of her responsibility for the harm 
                                                 
10 Note that responsibility here does not necessarily entail legal responsibility. Imagine, for example, that I say some-
thing rather mean to a colleague without any provocation, and hurt their feelings. In this situation I have transgressed, 
and I likely owe an apology. But under most reasonable interpretations of free speech, I have not done anything illegal. 
11 Although Cohen is concerned primarily with the offender’s psychological state in this essay, we can read his use of 
“necessary” as clearly normative. Cohen thinks that in situations like this one, where an offender is not blameworthy 
for the act itself, they might still be blameworthy for failing to apologize. 
12 This is not to deny that these are often important or central features of apologies. I merely mean to say that they are 
not my focus here. 
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or transgression the victim suffered. When Nick Smith (2008: 140) gives his account of  “categor-
ical apologies” (i.e. “the most robust, painstaking, and formal” apologies), he puts this idea in 
terms of proximate causation: 
In accordance with notions of proximate causation, the offender accepts causal moral responsibility 
and blame for the harm at issue. We can distinguish this from expressing sympathy for the injury or 
describing the injury as accidental or unintentional. (Smith 2008: 141) 
Indeed, as Smith (2008: 42) says, “if we can determine that someone did not proximately cause 
something – however contested matters of causation may be in any given case – then an apology 
from her will lack meaning related to accepting blame for the harm.” But as we will see from 
Christopher Kutz’s (2000) account of complicity, causal responsibility, proximate or otherwise, is 
not a necessary condition for moral responsibility.13 Kutz takes the 1943 firebombing of Dresden 
as his primary example. He asks us to consider a pilot who is weighing whether to participate in 
the murder of German civilians: “if he does not go, another will fly in his place, and even if he 
does go, his plane’s load of bombs will make no difference to the success of the raid” (Kutz 2000: 
121). Kutz’s point is that it is not the causal relationship between the pilot and the transgression 
that determines his responsibility. (I will return to this example later to say what Kutz thinks is 
important, but the point here is only to show that it is not a causal relationship.) Smith helps solve 
this issue by focusing on certain normative requirements of categorical apologies, foremost among 
which is that the categorical apologizer must have standing to apologize: 
The categorical apologizer will possess the requisite standing to accept blame for the wrongdoing. 
The offender can and does accept proximate responsibility for the harm and she – rather than a proxy 
or other third party – undertakes the work of apologizing described herein. (Smith 2008: 141) 
                                                 
13 With that said, causal responsibility might be sufficient for moral responsibility, construed as the responsibility to 
provide moral repair of some sort. The lorry driver case shows this: the driver is causally responsible for a harm, and 
thus owes an apology, even if he has not committed a wrong. 
12 
Although Smith does not abandon the language of causal responsibility here (as I think he 
probably should), his focus on standing provides us the best interpretation of this function of apol-
ogy. On my view, a person has standing to apologize when (and only when) they owe an apology. 
This is the central feature of apologies with which we are concerned here; this is what it means to 
be responsible. The apologizer, and any parties on behalf of whom they apologize, must owe an 
apology for the transgression or harm in question. Hence, I will stipulate a desideratum, D, for 
apologies: 
D: an apology should admit moral responsibility for a harm or transgression only 
on behalf of a party (or parties) who is (are) actually responsible. 
Of course I still have not said, specifically, what it means to be responsible, or to owe an 
apology; all I have said is that it is not a question merely of legal liability, responsibility to provide 
repair, or causal relationship. I think it is best to save this question for later. In section 4.2 I will 
discuss several plausible views of collective responsibility, but here my stipulation of D will suf-
fice to explain the potential deficiency of state apologies. As I have said, this desideratum is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for apology, but it identifies a central normative function that most good 
apologies perform. In this paper, then, I will refer to a purported apology that does not fulfill D as 
a deficient apology – one that does not perform a function that apologies should typically per-
form.14 That function is moral repair. Apologies typically help a transgressor make amends to a 
victim for some wrong; I submit that an apology cannot do this, or at least not fully, without meet-
ing desideratum D. The reason that so many theorists see the admission of responsibility as central 
to apology is not merely that it descriptively tracks our use of the term; there are normative reasons 
                                                 
14 Alice MacLachlan (2015: 444) puts it even more strongly, casting the admission of responsibility as a necessary 
condition for apology. Though I take up the weaker view in this paper, I am sympathetic to MacLachlan’s claim. 
13 
as well. Whether the function of apology is to mend a broken relationship, to promise better con-
duct in the future (e.g. Smith 2008: 144-145), or to acknowledge a victim’s moral worth (e.g. 
Helmreich 2015), the admission of responsibility is centrally important. 
I assume in this paper that at least some groups are at least sometimes capable of meeting 
this desideratum. In this assumption I mainly follow theorists who defend the idea that groups can 
be moral agents. Two prominent defenses of this view come from List and Pettit (2011) and Cohen 
and Samp (2013). As I have said, List and Pettit argue that groups of individuals can rely on certain 
norms and forms of coordination in order to act; when they do so, we can properly consider them 
not only groups but group agents. This agency is not reducible to the agency of individual constit-
uents, but neither does it rely on any metaphysically controversial assumptions. Instead, they say, 
agency is a result of complex aggregation functions that allow group attitudes to supervene on 
individual attitudes in a way that makes them independent of any particular individual without 
separating ontologically from the collection thereof. Cohen and Samp defend the more specific 
view that groups can apologize. They take a linguistic approach, arguing that we speak both truth-
fully and meaningfully when we say that the Church apologized for failing to address sexual mis-
conduct. In other words, the term “Church” successfully refers to something, and that something 
apologized. But as many who doubt the possibility of group agency15 point out, this raises the 
question of what that something is. Like List and Pettit, Cohen and Samp think groups consist of 
their members, along with the norms and properties that tie them together. So when we say “the 
Church apologized,” what we mean is that a representative (or small group of representatives) of 
the Church expressed regret, referenced a specific transgression, and admitted responsibility on 
behalf of the group. In short, Cohen and Samp think individuals can meaningfully represent groups 
                                                 
15 e.g. Cohen 1935; Lewis 1948; Wellman 1995; Narveson 2002; Velasquez 2003; Hasnas 2010. 
14 
in order to apologize on their behalf. This view is corroborated by people who think not only that 
groups can apologize, but that they can even have corresponding reactive attitudes, such as guilt 
or remorse (Björnsson and Hess 2016). So my assumption here is that not only individuals as part 
of groups, but groups themselves have the ability to apologize. 
Now, before continuing, I will note three features of our assumption that group apology is 
possible. First, this assumption does not obviously commit us to any controversial metaphysical 
claims. List and Pettit argue convincingly that groups can be agents in a way that is not reducible 
to the agency of individual group members, without implying that they have any sort of non-phys-
ical existence.16 Second, our conception of agency here is still fundamentally individualistic. Many 
writers who affirm the possibility of group agency maintain that individual humans are crucial (if 
not the only) units of moral concern. Even if we accept List’s and Pettit’s position, it may still be 
true, as H.D. Lewis (1948: 3) insists, that “responsibility belongs essentially to the individual.” As 
we will see in the following section, this has knotty implications for our ascription of responsibility 
to group agents. Finally, it should be clear that I have not assumed here that all, or even most group 
apologies meet our desideratum. In the next section I will examine one way in which group agents 
can fail to meet D when they apologize, and explain why states are more susceptible to this prob-
lems than other groups. 
3 THE COERCION PROBLEM 
In this section, I defend my main thesis: even with our assumption that group agents are 
generally capable of apologies, there are strong reasons to doubt whether state apologies will meet 
desideratum D. Recall: 
                                                 
16 See also Velasquez (2003: 532). 
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D: an apology should admit moral responsibility for a harm or transgression only 
on behalf of a party (or parties) who is (are) actually responsible. 
Before levelling a criticism against state apologies, I will say one more thing about the 
literature on group apologies. Group apology theorists tend to avoid distinguishing among various 
types of groups, so when discussing apology, they often lump states together with businesses, 
religious institutions, and other group agents. List and Pettit (2011: 40), for instance, affirm that 
“states… can count as distinct group agents, as they have their own goals and commitments…” 
And since they think group agents can be held morally responsible for their actions, it would be 
reasonable for them to hold that they can apologize, too. Linda Radzik (2001: 455) mentions mul-
tiple political apologies in which leaders explicitly implicate all their states’ citizens. She takes 
these as paradigmatic examples of “collective responsibility” (Radzik 2001: 456). In her later 
book, she also groups together “states, churches, and corporations” as collective agents (Radzik 
2009: 175). Likewise, Cohen and Samp (2013: 742) cite several examples of “corporate political 
apologies,” including Reagan’s apology for Japanese Internment. Indeed, this will be our main 
example of state apology for the rest of this paper. There is, however, a variety of dimensions 
along which groups can differ – and those who defend the possibility of group apologies ignore 
this at their peril. 
One important difference is that states, unlike other groups, systematically and character-
istically coerce. Thus arises what I will call the Coercion Problem, or CP: inherent in state action, 
and thus also in state transgression, is the coercion of citizens. And coercion is a mitigating factor 
in considerations of moral responsibility; if an individual agent is coerced into committing, sup-
porting, or being complicit in a moral transgression, their moral responsibility for that transgres-
sion is mitigated. Since we have cast standing to apologize as a function of moral responsibility, it 
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too is limited when an agent is coerced. Thus, when states coerce citizens into committing, sup-
porting, or being complicit in a transgression, they mitigate citizens’ moral responsibility for that 
transgression. 
I think this idea is fairly intuitive, and it is borne out by relatively uncontroversial examples. 
If Nathan punches Joe, he has standing to apologize to Joe, for he is morally responsible. But if 
Meagan threatens to kill Nathan unless Nathan punches Joe, then Nathan’s moral responsibility 
for succumbing to Meagan’s demand is mitigated by her (credible, we assume) threat. The person 
who has standing to apologize to Joe in this case is not Nathan, but Meagan. I will show that this 
idea applies to states and citizens in three steps. First, I will establish a working definition of co-
ercion. Second, I will argue that according to our working definition, states either always or almost 
always coerce their citizens when they act, and certainly when they transgress. Finally, I will argue 
that given this coercion, citizens are not individually responsible to the extent they would be in its 
absence, and thus do not have (as much) standing to apologize as members of non-coercive groups 
that transgress. 
3.1 Coercion 
There is a great deal of rich philosophical discussion about the concept of coercion. So, 
here we can neither articulate nor defend a full account. Still, while establishing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for coercion is beyond our scope, we can identify certain key themes common 
to many leading accounts. I draw on these to show that coercion entails a credible, impermissible 
threat that leaves the coercee with no choice but to succumb. 
Wertheimer endorses a “two-pronged” theory of coercion, on which coercion claims of the 
form “A coerces B to ” are true if and only if A’s proposal meets two conditions. First, there is 
the choice prong. For the coercion claim to be true, A’s proposal must constrain B’s options such 
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that B has “no acceptable alternative” but to succumb to A’s demand and  (Wertheimer 1987: 
267).17 Second, there is the proposal prong, which tests whether A somehow acted wrongly in 
proposing that B . This is where Wertheimer’s view imports a moral judgment: it is not just that 
A limits B’s options, but that A does so impermissibly, as determined according to a moralized 
baseline. So, impermissible threats limit B’s options such that B is worse-off than she should have 
been if the offer had never occurred.18 
I have argued elsewhere (Kushner 2019) that Wertheimer’s claim that coercion is imper-
missible per se is too strong. I agree with liberal theorists, such as Stanley Benn (1988: 87, 146), 
that states must justify coercion in order to use it legitimately, but also that they sometimes suc-
ceed. For that reason, let us weaken Wertheimer’s impermissibility criterion and say instead that 
coercion constitutes a pro tanto wrong – that is, an act that is impermissible without justification. 
Thus we can stipulate a working account: 
A coerces B into ing if and only if A credibly and (pro tanto) wrongly threatens to 
harm B unless B s, and A’s threat leaves B no acceptable alternative but to .19 
It is easy to see how certain paradigm cases will fit this account. Consider perhaps the best 
known example: a mugger puts a gun to someone’s head and says, “your money or your life.” The 
mugger has threatened to kill his victim unless the victim gives him all her money, and this threat, 
we can suppose, is clearly impermissible not only because the victim (presumably) does not owe 
the mugger any money, but also because murder is impermissible.20 What’s more, assuming the 
                                                 
17 See also Benn (1988: 141). 
18 Wertheimer does not say specifically what it would mean for B to be worse-off than she should have been, largely 
because he wants to avoid committing to any particular moral theory; instead, he motivates his account with prima 
facie moral judgments (Wertheimer 1987: 217). 
19 Note that both the threat and ing may constitute an inaction. For example, B might be coerced into not revealing 
compromising information about A. 
20 In this sense, the wrongness of the threat might be said to be parasitic upon the wrongness of the threatened act. For 
a fuller articulation of this view, see, e.g., Scanlon (2008) or Pallikkathayil (2011). 
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victim rationally prefers life to death, the threat has left her no acceptable alternative but to suc-
cumb to the demand and hand over her cash. Hence, the mugger coerces his victim. I now turn to 
examine how state actions might fit this definition. 
3.2 Do States Necessarily Coerce? 
It is often said that states maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their 
territories, and that they may permissibly use force to coerce their citizens. Indeed, many debates 
in liberal theory center on the justification of state coercion. So, given our working definition, in 
what sense can we say that states coerce, and are they necessarily coercive? First, consider a par-
adigmatic state action: taxation. To determine whether this is coercive on our working account, we 
must first look for a proposal from the state to its citizens. At least in the United States, citizens 
who refuse to pay taxes are subject to steep fines and, in cases of protracted recalcitrance, even 
prison time. So we can read the proposal as saying, pay your taxes or we will fine you. If you 
continue to refuse, we will incarcerate you. But does this proposal fulfill both of Wertheimer’s 
prongs? First is the choice prong, which asks whether the proposal limits a given citizen’s options 
such that opting-in — in this case, paying taxes — is the only rational choice. For most citizens, 
the choice is so easy that it does not merit deliberation; they choose to pay instead of going to 
prison. So the state does indeed limit the options of most citizens in a way that made opting-in the 
only rational choice. 
The second prong asks whether the proposal constitutes a threat — that is, whether it is a 
pro tanto wrong. Now, as I said above, this is where the taxation case gets tricky. We do not want 
to say here that taxation is illegitimate, unjustified, or even immoral, for this would prove far too 
much. All we want to show is that taxation is coercive. But this is precisely why I have specified 
that coercion is pro tanto wrong but not necessarily impermissible. On this view, if a proposal is a 
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threat, then making it requires some special type of moral justification.21 This does not mean such 
justification is impossible or even unlikely, only that it is morally necessary. The state’s proposal 
of incarceration as punishment for tax evasion is, I submit, one such instance. Again, this is not to 
say necessarily that taxation is immoral, illegitimate, or unjustified — just that it requires justifi-
cation.22 
So, taxation is coercive. But of course, this does not show that all state actions are coercive; 
indeed, I think some are not. Consider, for example, the recognition of The Star Spangled Banner 
as the national anthem by congress in 1931.23 This was clearly a state action. But was it coercive? 
I doubt it. First, there is no identifiable proposal between agents here; congress did not condition 
the acceptance of the song upon some action or inaction of any particular citizens. And we cannot 
point to any particular coercee in this case; Congress did not force anyone to act simply by recog-
nizing the song as the national anthem.24 It seems possible, then, for states to act without coercing. 
However, to say that not all state actions are coercive is not to say that states are not themselves 
coercive. For the structures that enable the state, foremost among them taxation, are indeed coer-
cive. While states do not necessarily coerce with every action, they rely upon coercion even simply 
to exist. There would be no official national anthem without a coercive state to recognize it as such. 
                                                 
21 To be clear, this is not what distinguishes threats from offers. It is a relevant feature of all threats, and some offers. 
Thanks to Andrew Altman for pointing this out. 
22 This reading of the state’s proposal as a threat also has the advantage of tracking ordinary language usage. We 
commonly think of taxation as necessarily involving some kind of threat, or at least an enforcement mechanism. The 
state does not ask for our money, but in an important sense, it takes it. 
23 Thanks to Andrew I. Cohen for suggesting this example. 
24 Of course we could argue that there are, now, certain seemingly coercive practices surrounding the national anthem. 
Sporting events are rich with examples of just this. But for the purpose of this example, I think we can safely ignore 
these. 
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3.3 The Deficiency of State Apologies 
Still, merely showing that states are coercive does not prove that citizens are not responsi-
ble for state transgressions. We must further show that there is some connection between the co-
ercion and the transgression. First, recall that coercion can mitigate moral responsibility – and 
therefore standing to apologize. I might owe my friend an apology for missing our lunch appoint-
ment, but I do not owe her an apology if I missed the appointment because someone threatened to 
kill me if I left my house. Wertheimer (1987: 185) is clear on this point, even taking it as the 
primary application of the concept of coercion: “we sometimes use coercion claims… to cancel 
the normal legal and moral effects of one’s act — to deny one’s obligation to keep a promise, to 
cancel the effects of the waiver of a right, or to absolve one of moral or legal responsibility for 
one’s immoral act.” So, if I were to apologize for missing the appointment, I would be apologizing 
on behalf of someone, myself, who is not morally responsible. (Now, I might owe my friend an 
explanation of why I missed our appointment – “I know I said I would meet you, but a crazed 
maniac threatened to kill me if I left my house” – but as soon as I offered this explanation, any 
perception that I owed an apology would dissipate.) In this case, then, my apology would fail to 
meet desideratum D because the party it implicates, myself, is not actually responsible – that is, 
does not actually owe an apology. 
Not all state actions fit this description of coercion. Imagine, for example, that The Star 
Spangled Banner was an explicitly racist song – that its lyrics affirmed some ideology privileging 
a particular race.25 If this were the case, recognizing it as the official national anthem constitutes a 
(prima facie) transgression. But since, as we said above, the act of recognition was not itself coer-
cive, it seems citizens could not escape responsibility for their complicity in the racist system that 
                                                 
25 Actually, it has been argued in multiple popular publications that this is indeed the case. See, e.g., Stiehm (2018). I 
do not take a stand on this issue. 
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enabled it – at least, not without taking measures to indicate that their strong dissent. If the state 
were ever to apologize for recognizing The Star Spangled Banner as the official national anthem 
(surprising though this development would be), I concede that it might rightly do so on behalf of 
the people. 
However, most state transgressions do involve coercion, so the national anthem example 
proves rather little in the way of state apologies. Let us return, then, to our main example of Japa-
nese Internment. Was it coercive? In one obvious sense it was, for it coerced Japanese-Americans 
into moving away from their homes forfeiting their civil liberties. But this tells us very little about 
moral responsibility. Victims of transgressions are not responsible for those transgressions, regard-
less of whether they were coerced into supporting them.26 What matters is not whether the trans-
gression itself was coercive, but whether the state coerced citizens into supporting it. I submit that 
the state did precisely this. For here, American citizens were coerced, through taxation, into fund-
ing the transgression. Federal tax dollars, coercively collected from U.S. citizens, funded the myr-
iad expenses of the Japanese Internment program, including transportation of prisoners, construc-
tion of camps, and wages for guards.27 
So in short, the answer is yes: the Japanese Internment program was indeed coercive, even 
to those citizens who were not its victims. They had no acceptable alternative but to contribute to 
the transgression. To see this point, consider, for example, the choice that confronted a reasonably 
well-informed, morally conscientious, non-Japanese US citizen of, say, 1944. Call her Anne. Be-
ing morally conscientious, Anne takes action against Japanese Internment: she speaks openly 
against it, implores her fellow citizens to see reason, and even writes to her representatives — all 
                                                 
26 It is worth noting here that two-thirds of Internment victims were American citizens, which means that through 
taxation, they were coerced into paying for their own subjugation (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration 
2017). I won’t examine this issue in detail, but at least intuitively, this seems to exacerbate the transgression. 
27 The total cost to the nation was estimated at $158,414,000 – over $4 billion in 2019 dollars (Truman Library). 
22 
to no avail. For our purposes here, we can suppose that even if Anne is responsible for Internment, 
no other citizen (save, perhaps, the victims of Internment) is less responsible than she is. That is, 
given her non-ideal moral circumstances, she has done all she reasonably can to act against her 
state’s transgression. So, when it comes time to pay taxes, Anne faces a dilemma. She could suc-
cumb and pay her taxes, knowingly supporting a moral transgression; or she could opt-out and 
avoid responsibility for the transgression, but go to prison for tax evasion. Knowing that Japanese 
Internment will occur either way, and knowing that she can likely do more to stop it if she is not 
incarcerated, Anne determines that even if her only motive were to stop Japanese Internment, she 
would still be better off succumbing to the coercion.28 And of course, stopping Japanese Intern-
ment is not her only motivation; she has numerous reasons, prudential and otherwise, to want to 
avoid prison. In other words, Anne has only one acceptable alternative: pay her taxes. She was 
coerced into doing so. 
From this, however, we cannot simply conclude that Anne is absolved of responsibility for 
the transgression. There are at least two complicating factors. First, it might be objected here that 
Anne’s reasoning is overly utilitarian, or that her purposes might be better served if she goes to 
jail and becomes a martyr for her cause. The costs of dissent are high in such a case, but not so 
much as to make succumbing her only acceptable alternative. Anne would not (necessarily) be 
irrational to opt-out of paying her taxes.29 So perhaps taxation was not coercive in this sense. To 
further illustrate this issue, consider again my previous example: someone threatens to kill me 
                                                 
28 That Japanese Internment would have occurred whether Anne paid taxes or not is significant, for it allows us to say 
that her calculation here – and thus also our assessment of her moral responsibility – is not based on her causal con-
nection to the transgression. This means that our discussion in this section still fits with Kutz’s account of responsi-
bility as based on the mental state of the agent, not on her causal contribution to the transgression. Just as an individual 
pilot’s choice will not affect what happens in Dresden, Anne’s choice will not affect whether Internment occurs. 
29 For our purposes, let us assume that she has this option: the state does not simply come and take her tax money, but 
instead demands that she give it to them. 
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unless I cancel my lunch date. Clearly, this is coercive; assuming the threat is credible (and assum-
ing I prefer to live, etc.), my only rational choice is to succumb and cancel the date. But if we raise 
the moral stakes of succumbing, the conditions of my choice change. If she tells me she will shoot 
me if I do not murder my own family, then not succumbing (i.e. choosing my own death instead 
of allowing the murder of my loved ones) seems to be a more rational option than it was before. 
Unattractive though this choice undoubtedly is, it does not seem to constitute coercion on our 
working definition.30 So if Anne ought to avoid supporting Japanese Internment, just as I ought to 
avoid killing my family, it seems that succumbing is not her only rational option. And since our 
definition of coercion requires succumbing to be the only rational option, it does not seem as 
though taxation is coercive in this case.31 
A second complicating factor is that the strength of the coercion can also affect the degree 
to which it mitigates responsibility. For our conception of responsibility is scalar. It is possible 
that coercion (or indeed, any other exculpatory factor) may render Anne less responsible than most 
other citizens, but still responsible to a certain degree. Most views of group apology can account 
for this. For instance, the Church’s apology implicated the Church, qua group, but in doing so it in 
no way denied that certain individuals were more responsible than others. Priests who knew details 
about the sexual assault and chose to remain silent are more responsible than Church members at 
                                                 
30 One might argue that this reveals a reductio against the definition: if such a threat is not coercive on a given definition 
of coercion, then that definition is wrong. I would respond, however, that coercion always entails succumbing. We 
cannot say ‘A coerced B into ing’ if B did not . Thus even when a threat is as blatantly immoral as the one presented 
to Anne, it is only coercive if Anne’s only rational choice is opting-in. Still, we can follow Wertheimer in saying that 
threats might be coercive without succeeding in coercing. This is clearly one such case. 
31 However, this seems to be a rather onerous moral ought to place on Anne. We need not say that Anne would be 
irrational to refuse to pay her taxes, but has she done something wrong by succumbing to the coercive threat? (If so, 
would it even count as a coercive threat? Can somebody wrong me by coercing me to do something I ought to do?) 
Some moral theories may imply that we ought to sacrifice our own well-being for a cause even when we know that 
doing so will not contribute to the amelioration or even mitigation of a transgression. But it seems implausible to say 
that Anne ought to have gone to prison. 
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another parish, who had only heard rumors of the transgression. Perhaps all those whom the apol-
ogy implicated were responsible to at least some extent. Reagan’s apology similarly allows for a 
scalar assignment of responsibility. It is consistent with the apology to say that camp guards were 
more responsible for Japanese Internment than citizens who supported the program out of overt 
racism; and in turn, that those racist citizens were more responsible than citizens like Anne, who 
opposed the program on moral grounds, but paid their taxes anyway. And importantly, this allow-
ance for scalar responsibility can help to avoid the Coercion Problem. If all citizens are responsible 
to some extent, even if only very slightly, the Coercion Problem does not occur. Thus, if no citizen 
is less responsible than Anne, and if Anne is still responsible to at least a small extent, there is no 
Coercion Problem. Thus, it seems rather reasonable to say that every citizen bore at least some 
responsibility for Japanese Internment, and thus Reagan’s apology on behalf of the people fulfills 
desideratum D. 
Both these arguments — that the exculpatory power of coercion depends on the moral 
stakes of the situation, and that our scalar conception of responsibility renders it more likely for 
citizens like Anne to be responsible — weaken the force of the Coercion Problem. There is, then, 
conceptual space to defend state apologies on behalf of the people. As I have said, my argument 
here is not that state apologies are impossible, nor that they are necessarily deficient because they 
always encounter the Coercion Problem. My argument, rather, is that they are especially vulnera-
ble to the Coercion Problem, which also makes them vulnerable to deficiency. For in addition to 
the two complicating factors I just mentioned, there are also two factors that increase the force of 
the Coercion Problem. First, in order for the Problem to occur, an agent must only be innocent 
with respect to the specific transgression in question, not with respect to all (or even all related) 
transgressions. It may be the case that although Anne vehemently opposed Japanese Internment, 
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she was a strong proponent of Jim Crow laws, making her responsible for that particular transgres-
sion. This responsibility is undoubtedly significant, but here it is ancillary. For as Cohen and Samp 
(2011: 744) note, apologies admit responsibility not in general, but for a specific transgression.32 
Thus in order for the Coercion Problem to occur, we do not have to say that Anne is some kind of 
perfectly innocent moral agent; all the Coercion Problem needs is for her to be innocent with re-
spect to the transgression in question. 
Second and more importantly, only a single member of the group — in this case, one citizen 
of the state — must be innocent in order for the apology to be deficient. For an apology “on behalf 
of the people” comes on behalf of all the people.33 Indeed, this claim is not specific to state apol-
ogies; the same is true of the Church and its members. Now, I recognize that this is a strong claim. 
While I have not said that a citizen such as Anne actually exists, or ever has existed, it seems that 
when we acknowledge that people can be coerced into contributing to a transgression without 
owing an apology for that transgression, there will exist at least one citizen in any given state who 
is not responsible for a given transgression. In other words, although it is not conceptually impos-
sible for all citizens in a given state to be responsible for a particular transgression, it seems (again, 
intuitively) unlikely. And this means that every apology on behalf of the people will be deficient. 
So, yes, this is a very strong claim. And I do mean to call into question whether there has ever been 
a state apology that did not encounter this problem. 
But even if this very strong thesis is true, we can weaken it by noting that deficiency, just 
like responsibility and coercion, is a scalar concept. Nothing in my account prevents us from saying 
that some apologies are more deficient than others. A state apology that implicates only one inno-
                                                 
32 See also Govier and Verwoerd (2002: 71), Smith (2008: 167-173). 
33 I accept this claim as true for now; I will defend it in Section 4.1. 
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cent citizen does quite a good job – far better than an apology implicating a large number of inno-
cent citizens. Indeed, the extent to which individual citizens are responsible also factors into the 
effectiveness of the state apology. An apology that implicates a hundred people who are only 
slightly responsible for a transgression is more deficient than an apology implicating a hundred 
moderately responsible individuals. It follows from these considerations that determining the ex-
tent to which a particular apology is deficient is largely an empirical matter. This also means that 
there are certain epistemic limitations on state apologies: a politician who purports to apologize on 
behalf of her constituents cannot make sure they are all responsible to a sufficient degree. There 
will be an allowable degree of deficiency for any given apology. I will not say what this degree is, 
nor do I think there is only one answer to this question. The allowable amount of deficiency will 
likely vary with context; presumably, the greater the transgression, the lower our tolerance for 
deficiency.34 The important point here, however, is not these empirical issues (though I think in-
vestigating them would be well worthwhile). Rather, I hope to have underscored that when an 
apology fails to fully meet desideratum D, it is not necessarily completely deficient, nor is it nec-
essarily a bad apology (relative to others in similar contexts). With this said, it is difficult for an 
apology that significantly or mostly fails to meet D to provide robust moral repair, and as I have 
argued, this is a serious normative concern. 
3.4 Summarizing the Coercion Problem 
I began this section with an account of coercion on which an agent’s act is coercive if and 
only if it (pro tanto) wrongly leaves a coercee with only one acceptable alternative, namely to 
succumb to the coercer’s demand. I then showed that, while not all state actions are coercive, states 
                                                 
34 Of course, there may be countervailing concerns here, as well. My account does not rule out raising our tolerance 
for deficiency when this is necessary to provide any moral repair at all. 
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must coerce in order to exist, and in order to transgress. This raises what I have called the Coercion 
Problem: when a state coerces individuals into supporting a transgression (through taxation), those 
individuals are not responsible for that transgression; thus when the state apologizes on their be-
half, this apology fails to meet desideratum D and is deficient. Now, to be clear, let me repeat that 
the Coercion Problem is neither specific nor necessary to state apologies. It can (and often does) 
occur in other kinds group apologies, and it is at least conceptually possible to imagine a state 
apology that avoids it. I therefore do not mean to defend a claim of conceptual impossibility in this 
paper. But as we have seen, the fact that states are inherently coercive makes the Coercion Problem 
far more problematic for them than for other agents. Indeed, I cannot think of a single actual state 
apology where the Coercion Problem does not crop up in some form. Such an apology is undoubt-
edly possible, but I have not yet come across an example. Of course this may well be my own 
shortcoming. So for this reason, the claim I wish to defend here is that while state apologies are 
not conceptually impossible, they are often – perhaps even always – deficient in at least one way. 
There are, of course, many concerns that arise on this strong conclusion. So, I will spend 
the remainder of this paper noting and offering preliminary responses to the strongest of these 
objections. I hope that in doing so, I will elucidate both my view and the reasons that support it. 
4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
Of the myriad objections to my view that immediately spring to mind, five seem particu-
larly concerning: the Triviality Objection, the Responsibility Objection, the Proving Too Much 
Objection, the Legitimacy Objection, and the Moral Repair Objection. Let us begin with the Triv-
iality Objection. 
28 
4.1 The Triviality Objection 
Strictly speaking, the Triviality Objection is not an objection to my view; it merely ques-
tions whether my view has presented any new or interesting information. The Objection argues 
that states do not mean to implicate citizens in their apologies, for it is trivially obvious that citizens 
are not responsible for state transgressions. I suspect that citizens do not consider themselves re-
sponsible for their states’ sins, and they are probably right not to. So when politicians apologize 
on behalf of their nation, we should not think of them as implicating citizens, for they do not think 
of themselves as implicating citizens. The Objection admits that state apologies would be deficient 
if they did implicate citizens, but denies that they often (or perhaps ever) do. Thus state apologies 
are not deficient in the way I have described; they do not fail to meet desideratum D because they 
do not purport to implicate anyone who is not responsible. So says the Triviality Objection. 
We can recognize immediately that a full response to the Triviality Objection would likely 
entail certain empirical claims, both about apologizing politicians’ intentions and about state apol-
ogies themselves. This seems difficult to provide (though note that the Objection has not provided 
any empirical evidence against my arguments, either). However, even in the absence of extensive 
data about apologies, there is significant evidence that the Triviality Objection is implausible. For 
it has become a common refrain, at least in American political apologies, for presidents to apolo-
gize “on behalf of the people.” This was particularly common at the end of the 20th century. Indeed, 
Reagan’s Japanese Internment apology is an excellent example. Recall that the apology came in 
the form of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, one of the explicit goals of which was to “apologize 
on behalf of the people of the United States for the evacuation, relocation, and internment of [Jap-
anese-American] citizens and permanent resident aliens” (emphasis added). Likewise, in 1993, the 
United States apologized to the Kingdom of Hawaii for overthrowing its government by force a 
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century before: “The Congress… apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the 
United States…” (emphasis added). And in 1999, President Clinton apologized for the US Gov-
ernment’s participation in unethical scientific testing on human subjects: “today, on behalf of an-
other generation of American leaders, and another generation of American citizens, the United 
States of America offers a sincere apology” (emphasis added). What are we to make of these sorts 
of statements? 
One way to tackle this issue would be to shrug it off as a mere rhetorical device. Call this 
the empty rhetoric account. On this account, apologizing on behalf of the people makes the senti-
ment seem more sincere. The apology aims at reconciliation among parties, some of whom have a 
grievance, but it need not implicate all citizens. After all, a U.S. president surely need not consider 
citizens responsible for the state’s transgressions. However, I do not think the empty rhetoric ac-
count is correct. I have several misgivings. Apologies on behalf of the people often come in the 
form of carefully written speeches – calculated not only in terms of their rhetorical impact but of 
their legal and moral implications. We should seriously what heads of state say, because what they 
say matters; they were elected, presumably legitimately, to represent their people. Even if their 
speeches are rhetorical, and they are, their words matter. And this point applies even more strongly 
to legislation. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 passed both houses of Congress and was signed into 
law by the president. Hundreds of elected representatives thought carefully, and collectively, about 
how to word it, and came to a level of agreement sufficient to meet a remarkably high standard for 
passing a bill into law. The words in that act – as in any law – are to be taken seriously. So, if we 
take it as a central function of group apologies that they admit responsibility, it seems unavoidable 
that the people are in some way implicated as responsible when governments apologize “on behalf 
of the people.” 
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Of course, not all political apologies explicitly mention the citizens, nor do they all seem 
to imply that the citizens are responsible. Consider, for example, former American Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara’s apology for his role in the Vietnam War. In his memoir, In Retro-
spect, he says, “we were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why” 
(McNamara and VanDeMark 1995: ) I think this clearly constitutes an apology; at any rate, it 
certainly fulfills desideratum D. But who is “we”? Interestingly, in an interview with the New York 
Times, McNamara seems to imply that “political bodies” are to blame: “People don't want to admit 
they made mistakes… This is true of the Catholic Church, it's true of companies, it's true of non-
governmental organizations and it's certainly true of political bodies” (Power 2003). Here it seems 
a stretch to say that McNamara intends to implicate citizens for the mistakes of a few elite military 
commanders. So perhaps this is a counterexample – a state apology that does not implicate the 
state’s citizens. But may we call this a state apology? McNamara’s unequivocal communication 
of personal remorse and even shame seems far more characteristic of an individual apology. This 
is not to say that heads of state cannot communicate remorse when they apologize, but rather to 
say that McNamara’s remorse was deeply personal. He seems to be apologizing on behalf of, at 
most, a few individuals who bore most of the responsibility for the harm. This is not, then, the 
counterexample it seems to be. McNamara’s remarks undoubtedly constitute an apology, but they 
do not constitute a state apology. 
4.2 The Responsibility Objection 
A second objection to my view states that citizens, qua citizens, are indeed responsible for 
state transgressions, in virtue of their responsibility for their role within a morally corrupt system. 
As Radzik (2009: 92) says, “people understand themselves as capable of offering apologies for the 
actions of their compatriots, employees, and children, and these apologies are indeed accepted as 
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such by their audiences.” If this is true, perhaps the notion that citizens owe apologies for state 
transgressions is not quite so objectionable. This is a direct refutation of my argument, so it war-
rants substantial discussion. And indeed, it is not without philosophical support. Here, I will gloss 
three plausible theories of collective responsibility – a Rousseauian view, a view from Christopher 
Kutz, and a forward-looking view – on which we could plausibly say that citizens are responsible 
for state transgressions, merely in virtue of being citizens.35 I then offer a preliminary reply. 
4.2.1 Rousseauian Responsibility 
I draw the first theory of collective responsibility from Rousseau’s The Social Contract 
(Book I): 
These clauses [of the social contract]…all come down to just one, namely the total alienation of 
each associate with all of his rights to the whole community: for, in the first place, since each gives 
himself entirely, and since the condition is equal for all, no one has any interest in making it bur-
densome to the rest. (Rousseau 1997: 50) 
This is a very strong ontological claim about the state – namely that it is comprised of its 
citizens. If this is true, then an action of the state is an action of the citizens, for we cannot make 
any ontological distinction between the state, qua agent, and the set of its citizens. It further follows 
from this that it is the citizens themselves who bear (joint) moral responsibility when their state 
transgresses. Few, however, are willing to commit to such a strong view of the state’s ontology, 
for we commonly think of the state and the set of all its citizens as distinct entities who, though 
they interact, do not necessarily bear any ontological connection to one another. 
4.2.2 Responsibility as Complicity 
A second theory on which private citizens might be responsible for state transgressions 
comes from Christopher Kutz’s book Complicity. Kutz (2000: 1) opens the book by describing 
                                                 
35 I am confident that there are more than three views that may be applicable here; but given the constrained scope of 
this paper, I discuss only the ones I take to present the strongest objections to my main argument. 
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several examples in which individuals “stand outside the shadow of evil…[but] do not find the full 
light of the good.” One of these examples is “a citizen of a nation that bombs another country’s 
factories in a reckless attack on terrorists.” The thought is that individuals can be complicit in 
collective harms or wrongs when they have “participatory intention – a conception that one is 
doing one’s part in a collective project” (Kutz 2000: 76). One way to interpret Kutz here is as 
giving a kind of mens rea account of moral responsibility, on which an individual must have a 
guilty mind – a clear intention to knowingly commit a crime. Indeed, the theory is in one sense 
Kantian, for Kutz (2000: 165) emphasizes that its ground “lies…in a conception [of individual 
accountability] that relates agents to wrongs and harms in virtue of the content of their wills.” But 
especially in cases of collective transgressions, mens rea is a high standard; it is rarely clear that 
someone was complicit because they had some sort of malicious intent. Indeed, as Larry May 
(2006: 313) puts it in his discussion of the Nuremberg Trials (which prosecuted crimes in which 
individuals were certainly complicit), “it is unclear whether anyone, except perhaps the highest-
ranking official, would meet the requirements of mens rea.” So, given Kutz’s stated goal of de-
fending a theory that could adequately account for individual accountability in collective harms, 
we should not interpret him as giving a mens rea account. 
Rather, Kutz thinks an individual intends to participate in a collective project when they 
intentionally contribute to achieving its end, with the knowledge that their contribution will be 
known to other participants and the expectation that others will participate as well. These expec-
tations and relationships need not be robust; they can occur among complete strangers just as easily 
as close friends. This low bar for complicity is intentional. Kutz goes out of his way to ensure that 
people who contribute only minimally are not excluded from our responsibility. Even actions that 
do not causally contribute to a transgression, such as voting, can be sufficient to “[exemplify] one’s 
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membership in a group or participation in an activity,” and thus intentionally participate in it (Kutz 
2000: 82). On this broadly inclusive view, we might be responsible for state transgressions not just 
in virtue of paying our taxes, but in virtue of any political participation in a morally corrupt system. 
This conception of participatory intention motivates what Kutz calls the Complicity Principle: 
The Complicity Principle: (Basis) I am accountable for what others do when I intentionally par-
ticipate in the wrong they do or harm they cause. (Object) I am accountable for the harm or wrong 
we do together, independently of the actual difference I make. (Kutz 2000: 122) 
Note that the Complicity Principle is broader than any account of causal responsibility we 
might offer. Kutz’s account of responsibility is therefore even stronger than Smith’s; on it, we can 
be responsible for any act in which we participate, regardless of our causal connection to its out-
come. Kutz (2000: 146) insists that the Principle is a threshold concept: “an agent who participates 
intentionally in a wrong is accountable in some form for that wrong.” But of course this does not 
mean that all intentional participant are equally accountable, for Kutz allows that some individuals 
are more accountable than others. Hence, “the responses due [to complicit individual agents] must 
reflect the nature of their conceptions of their role and identity within the shared project” (Kutz 
2000: 165). We can quibble with Kutz on the importance of the agent’s conception of their ac-
countability as opposed to their actual accountability, but the important point here is that his ac-
count allows for scalar attributions of responsibility. 
Kutz’s (2000: 118) primary example here is a state action – the 1943 firebombing of Dres-
den – and his primary concern is with the “pilots, navigators, bombers, and gunners” who carried 
it out. He concludes that their participatory intentions render them complicit in the act.36 But what 
of the citizens of the Allied Nations? Were British and American civilians at the time also com-
plicit in the firebombing of Dresden? Kutz does not answer these questions directly, but it seems 
                                                 
36 By ‘the act’ I mean a single act, the firebombing of Dresden, undertaken by a group agent, the state. Individual acts, 
e.g. by individual pilots, are properly viewed as contributions to the collective act. 
34 
clear that his account directs an answer in the affirmative. For he does say explicitly that partici-
pation in a political process, e.g. voting, may render an individual accountable for their state’s 
transgression even if they had no (direct) causal relationship to it. British and American citizens 
participated in the political processes that led to the firebombing, and so while they are not “in the 
shadow of evil,” neither are they clearly in the “full light of good.” This seems even more obvious 
in the Japanese Internment case. For here, most American citizens had ample knowledge of the 
transgression, and many explicitly supported while it occurred. Now, as I have said, this does not 
mean that all citizens shared equal responsibility with the people directly connected to the incident, 
nor does it necessarily imply that citizens deserved punishment or owed material repair – though, 
given the severity of the transgression in this case, they might have.37 These are complex issues 
that warrant more discussion than this paper allows. But given the now widely acknowledged fact 
that there was no evidence to suspect any kind of threat widespread enough to warrant Japanese 
Internment, in addition to the fact that not a single seditious citizen was apprehended – and fur-
thermore, given the fact that Internment was a brazen violation of both constitutional and natural 
rights regardless of the presence or absence of sedition among Japanese-Americans – it seems 
reasonable to say that victims of Internment were owed an apology at the very least. So if we 
accept Kutz’s account, on which citizens are complicit in and therefore accountable for state trans-
gressions, I think we can reasonably say that the state has standing to apologize on their behalf.38 
So perhaps Reagan fulfilled desideratum D when he apologized. 
                                                 
37 As Kutz (2000: 123) says, “at least for serious harms, a normative theory of complicitous accountability must have 
a political component: Such a theory must justify the coercive application of penal and compensatory institutions.” 
38 Perhaps this is still too strong. We might say that citizens are complicit not in virtue of having voted simpliciter, but 
rather in virtue of having voted in a particular way, namely for the party or individual that would (continue to) commit 
the transgression. Jason Brennan (2016: 159) seems to offer something like this view (though he does not develop it): 
“The voters who put the National Socialists in power in Germany in 1932 cannot be held responsible for everything 
their government did. But much of what their government did was foreseeable by any reasonably well-informed per-
son, and so their supporters were blameworthy” (emphasis added). Thus even if we find that Kutz is too quick to 
implicate all private citizens, his account might be weakened to still plausibly implicate many of them. 
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4.2.3 Forward-Looking Responsibility 
However, since Complicity was published, discussions of both individual and collective 
responsibility have given rise to another kind of theory, which represents a third way in which we 
might say that citizens are responsible for state transgressions. I am referring here to forward-
looking, or accountability-based theories of responsibility. Whereas traditionally, models of re-
sponsibility have focused on the metaphysics of blame for past transgressions, forward-looking 
theories are concerned with the future redress that agents owe. As Zheng says: 
Accountability…concerns a moral and political (rather than metaphysical) problem. When a person 
fails to carry out a duty, the burdens of redress must be distributed across the community somehow 
or other; and it is sometimes appropriate to place burdens on an agent even if it did not result from 
a faulty exercise of agency. (Zheng 2018: 872-873) 
While accountability models must often look to the past to determine who owes redress, they need 
not always. In short, this type of theory of responsibility is concerned not with whom to blame for 
the transgression, but with who must fix it.39 Thus, “[individual] agents need not meet the high bar 
required for blame and punishment to bear accountability” (Zheng 2018: 873). So, what is this 
lower bar, and how might citizens meet it when their state transgresses? 
Forward-looking theories differ on the answer to this question. One prominent forward-
looking theory, for example, is Iris Marion Young’s “Social Connections Model.” Young (2011: 
105) casts responsibility in terms of participation in unjust structures: “responsibility in relation to 
injustice…derives…from participating in the diverse institutional processes that produce structural 
injustice.” Young’s account then focuses on determining who is responsible, not on assignments 
of blame. She is especially concerned with who is responsible, in the forward-looking sense, for 
                                                 
39 For instance, we might not think an individual motorist is blameworthy for rising atmospheric CO2 levels, but we 
might legitimately expect her to contribute to efforts to reduce the effects of climate change (e.g. by taking public 
transportation or investing in a fuel-efficient vehicle). 
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mitigating unjust structures. Still, as we saw above with Kutz’s account, participation in an injus-
tice is not always sufficient to show moral responsibility – backward- or forward-looking. Recog-
nizing this issue, other recent forward-looking accounts set the bar for responsibility differently. 
Zheng (2018: 873) proposes the “Role-Ideal Model” of accountability, on which we are “individ-
ually responsible for structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles.” It is our roles, 
in other words – “as parents, colleagues, employers, citizens, etc.” – that render us accountable for 
addressing structural injustices (Zheng 2018: 870). 
So, whether we accept Young’s, Zheng’s, or someone else’s40 forward-looking account of 
responsibility, it seems clear that citizens bear at least some responsibility for mitigating their 
states’ transgressions.41 One way in which they might do this is by providing moral repair – spe-
cifically, by apologizing. Since on these views, citizens are indeed responsible to a certain degree, 
an apology on their behalf would seem to meet desideratum D. So, on a forward-looking view, just 
as on Kutz’s view, states can rightly implicate their citizens when they apologize. 
4.2.4 Responding to the Responsibility Objection 
For the most part, I find the Kutzian and forward-looking accounts of responsibility (con-
strued in terms of what it means to owe an apology) convincing. Indeed, I am not completely 
convinced that the Rousseauian view is false, though I think it has some serious ontological ex-
plaining to do. My goal here is neither to choose between nor to argue against these accounts. I 
hope to have shown, rather, that there is ample support for the idea that individuals can be morally 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., David Miller (2007: ch.4). 
41 One might object that I have drawn this conclusion too hastily, as forward-looking accounts are primarily concerned 
not with individual transgressions, but with structural injustices. I have, admittedly, taken a fairly solipsistic view of 
transgression by leaving the background structures that lead to injustices largely aside. I agree with the objector that 
my account could be strengthened by considering more structural factors. I doubt, however, whether this would change 
the conclusion that forward-looking accounts implicate citizens. Zheng’s and Young’s projects are to examine indi-
vidual responsibility; for this reason, I will not address this concern in any more detail here. 
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responsible for collective wrongs, and specifically state wrongs. I do not think the view that citi-
zens, qua citizens, owe apologies for state transgressions is obviously mistaken. As I have argued, 
however, it is mistaken. The Objection does not weaken my argument because it fails to respond 
to my point about the normative force of coercion to mitigate claims of responsibility. For both 
Kutz and defenders of forward-looking accounts seem to view responsibility as involving volun-
tary, non-coerced action. So even if they are correct that something as seemingly insignificant as 
a participatory intention or a social role can make us responsible, the fact of coercion mitigates 
that responsibility. My account, as I see it, is compatible with Kutz’s, Zheng’s, or Young’s view. 
4.3 The Proving too Much Objection 
A third objection critics might level against my argument is that it proves too much by 
implying that many, or perhaps even all group apologies fail to meet desideratum D. The Church, 
for example, wields an enormous amount of influence over its members; in some places, that in-
fluence approaches the level of power that states possess. Likewise, BP’s power over its investors 
might be viewed as coercive in some cases. Indeed, some recent theories of coercion have at-
tempted to account for cases such as the Church or BP, which seem coercive but do not fit 
Wertheimer’s two-pronged definition. Scott Anderson (2010, 2016), for example, argues that co-
ercion merely requires an imbalance of power (social political, economic, or otherwise) between 
coercer and coercee. I have said that these apologies avoid the Coercion Problem, but this does not 
seem to be true if we adopt an approach such as Anderson’s. 
However, as I have argued before (Kushner 2019: 9-11), Anderson’s approach to coercion 
risks over-inclusivity in two ways. First, when we de-moralize our theory of coercion as he claims 
to do (Anderson 2010: 17), we lose our ability to differentiate between certain clearly coercive and 
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clearly non-coercive acts (Nozick 1969: 450-451).42 But second, and more importantly for our 
purposes here, Anderson’s account has trouble tracking our intuitions about coercion. Since he 
thinks that any imbalance of power can produce coercion, he has trouble saying that, e.g., monop-
olies and monopsonies can possibly be noncoercive. If a power company is the only electric sup-
plier in a given area simply because no other company got there first, they do not coerce their 
customers by charging high prices. The company has done nothing wrong, pro tanto or otherwise, 
by charging the price it does. Anderson’s account does not seem to be able to exclude this situation 
(Kushner 2019: 10-11). Pope Francis’ apology is another excellent example. Members of the 
Church are not coerced into attending mass, tithing, or even retaining Church membership. At least 
on our (and Wertheimer’s) conception, these actions are non-coerced. Now, here an objector would 
argue that this position ignores the often immense social pressures associated with Church mem-
bership. Not just individuals, but entire families often build their identities around their faith, and 
this makes the cost of exit exceptionally high. It seems unlikely, however, that this is an instance 
of coercion, for the Church does not limit its members’ options in the requisite way. The Church 
offers people a religious option, but it does not take away other religious options. At most, I think 
Wertheimer (1987: 225-241) might call this exploitation, but not coercion. Indeed, there is support 
for drawing this particular distinction between states and private corporations in more recent writ-
ings on the topic. Bernard Boxill, for example, says: 
…the analogy between a firm or corporation and the state fails. People are not born into firms or 
corporations, and they can easily join or leave firms or corporations. No one has to belong to a firm 
or corporation. Further, when people join a corporation they understand that they are joining some-
thing that may have liabilities that they may be assuming when they join. None of this applies to the 
state. People are born into states, and must belong to some state or other. We cannot say that when 
they came of age they were told that they were at the point of joining a firm or corporation with 
hefty debts they will have to pay if they join. And even if they were told this it would not mean that 
they freely took on the duty to pay the country's slave debts, for people are born into a country and 
usually have nowhere else they can go to readily. (Boxill 2003: 71-72). 
                                                 
42 Still, I argue (Kushner 2019: 10-11) that his approach is not fully de-moralized. 
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So, is the Church coercive? Does it coerce people to tithe or retain membership, and in 
doing so mitigate their responsibility for the transgression? I doubt it. The Church has seen a de-
cline in attendance and donations in recent years, and this is likely due at least in part to the sexual 
abuse scandals. Having expressed their moral disapproval by refusing to fund an institution that 
allows such abuses, those who left or stopped tithing do not seem to be implicated by Francis’ 
apology. The apology was for an inaction, but these people acted. Those who did not express their 
disapproval, however, and voluntarily chose to tithe or donate despite ample evidence of protracted 
wrongdoing, are certainly (pro tanto) wrong. Thus the apology properly implicates them as con-
stituents of a responsible group. Three caveats are important here. First, as I have said, there are 
varying levels of responsibility in this and most cases of group apology. The Priests who chose to 
remain silent despite knowledge of sexual assault are more responsible than the members who 
continued tithing even after the scandals broke. We could even say that members who reduced the 
amount of their donations are less responsible than those who did not, but still responsible to an 
extent. Desideratum D does not preclude this. Second, I do not mean to imply that tithing was 
morally wrong in this case, or even that these members should not have tithed. Church members 
had to weigh certain moral oughts against one another. While they may have seen clearly that they 
ought not tithe, they may also have seen clearly that they ought to support an institution that was 
important to them and their identity. I only mean to say that by continuing to tithe despite 
knowledge of wrongdoing, Church members exercised moral agency and are therefore morally 
responsible for that wrongdoing, even if only to a small extent, and even if that wrongdoing was 
their best moral option given non-ideal circumstances. Third, group membership is not a necessary 
condition for responsibility. Customers of a jewelry store that sources its diamonds from mines 
where working conditions are inhumane are not considered members of that group, but insofar as 
40 
they are aware of the transgression, they may be responsible for it nonetheless. Thus they also may 
owe an apology. They are not, however, implicated in the group apology, because they are not 
members of the group; in no sense can their actions be taken as the actions of the group. Thus just 
as individuals can share responsibility with one another, so too can groups share responsibility 
both with other groups and with individuals. 
The same is true of BP’s apology. Shareholders are responsible here because they had the 
option to divest from the transgressing corporation, but chose, voluntarily, not to do so. So when 
Heyward apologized on behalf of BP, he rightly implicated BP’s shareholders. Neither the Church 
nor BP engaged in coercion, so the Coercion Problem does not apply to their apologies. Now, it 
may be the case that other, non-coercive factors mitigate group members’ moral responsibility for 
transgressions as well. For example, there may have been no way for most BP shareholders to 
know that the oil spill would occur beforehand, so an apology on their behalf might not have met 
desideratum D either. The point here is not that coercion must occur in order for an apology to fail 
to meet desideratum D. As the BP example shows, groups can fail to meet it in multiple ways. The 
point, rather, is, that it is possible for non-state groups to avoid the Coercion Problem when they 
apologize. Thus my argument does not eliminate the possibility of group apologies altogether, 
though it does place a rather restrictive (and, in my view, important) limitation on them. 
4.4 The Legitimacy Objection 
Another objection is that even if coercion occurred, legitimate states are granted the au-
thority both to represent and to coerce their constituents. States need not solicit consent from their 
citizens each time they act; if they had to ask, we probably would not call their actions coercive 
coercion. But as I have said above, they are coercive – and perhaps legitimately so; in liberal 
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democracies we want our state to be able to enforce certain policies that align with whatever po-
litical principles we agree upon. Thus when the state acts, it does so with the consent of its citizens, 
and so by virtue of having legitimized it, they are responsible for what it does. 
A reply to this objection would, I think, require complete theories both of legitimacy and 
of coercion, neither of which is within the scope of this project. I can, however, offer a preliminary 
remark. On an appropriately moralized theory (e.g. Simmons 1999), legitimacy does not give the 
state a blank check on the citizens’ behalf. That is, a legitimate state cannot simply do anything 
because it has the de facto authority to do so; it must meet minimal moral standards, too. Presum-
ably, whatever standards we can reasonably come up with, they would not authorize the state to 
detain an entire group of citizens, without due process, based only upon race. We can say, then, 
that even if the United States in the early 1940s was indeed legitimate, the deeply immoral Japa-
nese Internment Program was not a proper extension of this legitimacy.43 Thus even if we grant 
(a) that legitimate states may coerce their citizens, and (b) that this coercion generally does not 
excuse those citizens from moral responsibility for states’ acts, we may still claim (c) that citizens 
are exculpated when states coerce them into supporting prima facie immoral acts, for legitimacy 
does not grant states the right to commit transgressions in the name of their citizens. Bernard Boxill 
(2003: 75-76), interpreting John Locke, makes precisely this point: “although [Locke] allowed that 
citizens may consent to the unjust acts of their government, such consent is not contained in the 
consent they give to government that makes it legitimate.” In other words, citizens can consent to 
be complicit in state transgressions, as many Americans surely did during Japanese Internment; 
                                                 
43 A small caveat: note that on views such as Simmons’, a state’s legitimacy is indexed to particular citizens. The state 
might be legitimate with respect to some citizens, but not others. I take it as a basic premise, however, that given the 
deeply immoral nature of Japanese Internment, there was no citizen with respect to whom this act counted as legiti-
mate. 
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but we cannot infer this consent from the fact that they have given a general consent to be gov-
erned. Likewise, even if the United States had been a legitimate state at that time, this does not 
imply that citizens consented to all its actions. As I said, this response is not meant to be compre-
hensive, for this is not a paper about legitimacy. It is meant to show merely that my conclusion 
regarding the Coercion Problem in the previous section is consistent with a robust conception of 
legitimacy. 
4.5 The Moral Repair Objection 
Even if my responses to all these objections have succeeded, an even more basic objection 
remains. The Moral Repair Objection states that my view implies that full moral repair is impos-
sible in certain cases, perhaps including Japanese Internment. Many of the worst transgressions in 
history have been committed by states, including liberal democracies, so denying their ability to 
apologize in a non-deficient way removes important aspects of our moral landscape, so to speak. 
Victims of transgressions are owed moral repair, and an important part of this is apology. In other 
words, victims of state transgressions such as Japanese Internment are owed an apology from 
somebody, so an account that denies this ability in at least some cases falls short. I think there are 
two possible responses here. First, denying the ability of states to apologize does not deny the 
ability of responsible parties to apologize. Even if we concluded, strongly, that a state cannot 
apologize in a given situation, it does not follow that nobody can apologize. Whoever is responsible 
for the transgression, whether they were acting within their official capacity or not, still owes an 
apology. So it may be true that the citizens of the United States did not owe an apology when 
Reagan apologized on their behalf. But President Roosevelt, the contractors who built the camps, 
and the camp guards all did owe an apology, not on behalf of the state, but on their own behalves. 
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This answer will hardly be satisfactory in many cases. President Roosevelt, who initially 
implemented the Japanese Internment program (or oversaw the regime that did) likely owed an 
apology, but he is dead, so an apology will not be forthcoming. Indeed, even if he were alive, it is 
doubtful whether he would have apologized, for he likely did not see Japanese Internment as a 
transgression at all. So my answer is unsatisfactory for the simple reason that even if it is true, it 
does nothing to improve the chances that a non-deficient apology will actually occur. Consider, 
however, a simplified parallel case. Imagine that I owe my friend an apology for a mean comment, 
but since I (wrongly) feel the comment was permissible, I do not apologize. This is not, I submit, 
an issue with our discussion of apology itself; it is some kind of moral failing of me, qua moral 
agent. 
Of course, the issue is often even deeper than this simple example suggests. In so many of 
the examples we have discussed in this paper, responsibility is distributed over a large number of 
natural agents who were complicit in a given transgression. This means that while each of those 
may owe some small apology, none on their own owes an apology that fits the magnitude of the 
transgression. This is the role that the state apology would have filled, had it been possible. Anna 
Stilz (2011) calls this a “responsibility shortfall.” “While we can attribute some liability to indi-
viduals,” she says, “this does not add up to liability for the entire harm” (Stilz 2011: 193). The 
Moral Repair Objection, then, contends not just that moral repair will be incomplete when apolo-
gies are not forthcoming. 
Thus a second, stronger response to the Moral Repair Objection is in order. The stronger 
response is that in situations such as Japanese Internment, where transgressions have done indeli-
ble damage, there is a conceptual limit on the possibility of adequate moral repair. For as David 
Schmidtz (2006: 214-215) notes with respect to Japanese Internment, “[the apology] was too late 
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and the crime too huge for anything to make victims whole.” Even Reagan’s reparations did not 
come close to making the victims whole. And the responsible parties, as I have said, are long dead. 
So what are we to do in these situations? Schmidtz argues that moral repair in such situations 
should aim for something closer to reconciliation than revenge. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Now to be clear, let me repeat that the Coercion Problem is neither necessary nor specific 
to state apologies. That is, I have not shown that state apologies can never meet desideratum D, 
for some may have features that differ from the Japanese Internment case enough to render an 
apology possible. For example, there simply might be no Anne — that is, no innocent citizen — 
in a given case. We could imagine a Japanese Internment example where racism was so prevalent 
among citizens that not a single one disagreed with the program, on moral grounds or otherwise. 
In such a case, every citizen is responsible not just because they pay taxes, but because they either 
support or do not care about the transgression. In this case, meeting the desideratum seems possi-
ble, because all the parties whom the apology implicates are actually responsible, even if only to 
a small extent. 
We should recognize, however, just how unlikely this possibility is. First, I doubt there is 
a single case in American history where not one citizen actively dissents against a political deci-
sion. From slavery abolitionists to protestors against the war in Vietnam, there is a long history of 
dissent against the state in the US. And second, almost every historical example of egregious trans-
gression by the state — slavery, Jim Crow, Indian removal, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, and 
modern mass incarceration, to name only a small handful — has involved clear, concerted action. 
So, can states meet desideratum D, and thus give an apology that fulfills a primary norma-
tive function of moral repair? In theory, yes. For we can imagine a state apology that avoids the 
45 
Coercion Problem. But it is crucial to recognize just how difficult it is for a state to meet this 
standard. As I have said, every instance of an official United States apology I can find encounters 
the Coercion Problem to some degree. So while, yes, it is conceptually possible for states to meet 
desideratum D, I conclude that the coerciveness of states gives us an excellent reason to doubt 
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